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State Capacity, Social Mobility, and Terrorist Groups In Thailand and the Philippines

Submitted by Sarah McDonald



Abstract

Thailand and the Philippines face similar security issues, including separatist violence in their southern provinces. However, the developmental paths of the two countries and the governments' reactions to the minority ethno-religious separatist movements, the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the Philippines, have varied greatly. In Thailand, the government's desire to create a singular national identity from mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds has created periods of forced assimilation tempered by attempts at conciliation. Conversely, the Philippines continued colonial policies of economic and political oppression of the Moro but created the institutions necessary for social pluralism. The differing policies of the Thai and Filipino governments have shaped the orientation of the separatist movements within the countries. Currently, the size and power of the MILF in the Philippines has forced the government to attempt peace talks with the group. However, in Thailand the reclusive nature of the BRN-C remains hinders communications with the Thai government. This paper demonstrates that the actions taken by the governments of Thailand and the Philippines have fostered current separatist and terrorist movements. Addressing these problems will require state policies that reflect pluralism

and institutions that support social aspirations.

Glossary

ARMM – Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
 Berastu – Unity, separatist group in Thailand
 BNPP - Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani
 BRN – Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front)
 CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
 CPT – Communist Party of Thailand
 Malay – ethnic minority group in Thailand
 MIM – Moro Islamic Movement formerly the Moro Independence Movement
 THE MNLF - Moro National Liberation Front
 MILF - Moro Islamic Liberation Front
 Moro - ethnic minority group in the Philippines
 OIC – Organization of the Islamic Conference
 PAO - Provincial Administrative Organizations (Thailand)
 PULO - Patani United Liberation Organization
 SBPAC – Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre
 SPCPD – Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development

	Thailand	Philippines
Education	Regulation of curriculum in punohs Forced assimilation	Secularization of schools
Reaction from government	Relied on military rather than political action to deal with violence	Peace agreements and ceasefires Direct political action
Separatist groups	BRN and BRN-C Goals murky at best, leaders hide in countryside	MNLF and MILF Well known leaders and goals
Size of groups	Exact numbers unknown, estimated at times as low as 300 to 500 active members	At peak 30,000 estimated members
Focus of groups/ conflict	Focus of group unknown. The conflict is both religiously and ethnically based	MILF aimed for a broader political goal based on the ethnic/religious identity of the Moro
Class issues	Low overall country output/wages until industrial revolution in late 1980s	Government reallocation of ancestral Moro land to Christians (cycle of poverty)
Regional affect	Malay have appealed to Malaysian government for aid in crisis	Connection with Muslim community in Sabah and Borneo
Outside funding	Some claim Jamaa Islamiya connection to the BRN but the BRN and scholars deny these claims	Malaysian government (weapons, transport, etc.) Aid from Libya under Kadaffi
Organization of separatist group	Top down structure in the BRN-C, with a military and political wing	Loosely knit with some infrastructure including a central committee and the BMA (Bangsa Moro Army)
Religious demographics	94% Buddhist 5% Muslim <1% Christian, Hindu, Sikh, or Jewish	90% Christian 5% Muslim <1% Buddhist, Sikh, or animist

Introduction

Thailand and the Philippines are currently experiencing similar security concerns, including separatist violence in their southern provinces.

The violence stems from minority ethnoreligious groups, namely the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the Philippines. Despite largely similar histories, the developmental paths of the separatist movements and governmental responses of the two countries have greatly affected their reactions and level of success with the separatist movements. The focus in Thailand on identity issues, and the government's inability to create lasting and stable institutions through which to mediate identity issues, has left the Malay with few official avenues through which to express their problems. Due to this, some Malay have begun to work outside of the system in separatist groups. However, in the Philippines the government's economic oppression has been tempered by a political readiness to mitigate societal issues. That has enabled separatist groups to be open about their leadership and aims, which has led to negotiations and attempted peace treaties with the government.

History before the Modern States

The creation of Thailand and the Philippines as unified states only occurred in the early twentieth century. Prior to this, Thailand was a series of provinces ruled by local leaders and the Philippines was a colony of Spain. Even after the Philippines became a unified state, it was a colony of the United States until 1946. However, the history of the Malay and Moro date back much further than the creation of Thailand and the Philippines, which has had an impact on the

current separatist movements.

Thailand

The beginnings of modern Thai history can be traced to the eleventh through thirteenth centuries when the ethnic group, the Thai, began migrating south from China and controlling regions in China as well as in the Northern provinces of modern-day Thailand (Wyatt 2003, 30). However, prior to the Thai arrival, three ethnic groups, the Mon, Khmer, and the Malay, resided in the area of Thailand and controlled independent provinces. Of these three ethnic groups, only the Malay in the south were animists, and the Mon and Khmer, sometimes placed together as the Mon-Khmer, were Buddhist (Wyatt 2003, 20). The Thai created local leadership similar to that already existing in the provinces. In time, the Mon and Khmer assimilated with the Thai, as they shared a common faith and Chinese heritage. Meanwhile, the southern provinces of Thailand, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun were controlled under the local area of Malacca until 1511 (Harish 2006, 50). At this point, the Portuguese had overtaken Malacca and all of the provinces were placed under the watch of the Kingdom of Siam (Thai government). This new arrangement included the payments of tribute to the king, but the provinces were allowed to retain local leadership, often called rajas or kings (Harish 2006, 50). Around this same time, trade boomed in the southern provinces and with it brought the Islamic religion (Islam 1998, 443). It quickly became the dominant faith in the south by the late fifteenth century, and being Malay and being Muslim became synonymous. For the next two centuries, the three southern provinces would continue to

govern themselves, occasionally engaging in skirmishes with the Siam government but never being under direct control.

In 1785, after numerous rebellions and refusals to pay tribute, the King of Siam overthrew the raja of the provinces and placed them under direct Siam control (Islam 1998, 443). Despite being under the control of the Thai government, the raja retained some local status and could be influential in the southern provinces. This would end when in 1901, when under pressure from the British government the Siamese government created an official administrative body to rule the “area of the seven provinces” (Harish 2006, 51). In essence this created a “unified” Thailand (than called Siam), so that the king had official control over all of the provinces of Thailand – thus finally ending the power of local southern leaders.

From this point until 1932, with the marginalization of the king and the creation of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay had virtually no representation in the government. With the establishment of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay won some minimal spots in the National Assembly and Parliament (Harish 2006, 52). It would seem that Thailand was beginning a promising new government, including plurality in and representation from all provinces. However, in 1938, the fledgling democracy was deposed in a coup and Thailand was forced under the control of the military (composed mainly of Thai Buddhists). This would drastically change the quality of life for the Malay in the south and affect relations between the Thai Buddhists and the Malay throughout the twentieth century.

The Philippines

The Philippines faced a similar early historical path to that of Thailand. The islands that compose the Philippines were inhabited by many ethnic groups, collectively termed Malayo-Polynesian (Islam 1998, 444). They were governed by local leaders, often termed sultans. The Moro resided largely in the southern province of Mindanao. No unified state of the Philippines existed and outside influences from Malaysia remained a force in political life. Similarly to Thailand, Islam was introduced in the southern provinces in the early fourteenth century through trade (Islam 1998, 444). Soon it too became the dominant religion, most closely associated with the Moro. Shortly after Islam was introduced in the Philippines, the Spanish gained control of the southern provinces of Mindanao and Sulu (predominately Moro in composition) in 1565 (Islam 1998, 444). The Spanish never officially gained a mandate over these provinces but governed them as a colony anyway. This is exemplified most predominately in the attempts by the Spanish to convert the Moro to Catholicism. Their efforts were largely unsuccessful so the Spanish began to “reallocate” Moro land to Spanish Catholics (and those they are able to convert) in an attempt to forcibly change the religious and ethnic composition of the southern provinces.

Despite the fact that the Philippines were never officially a Spanish territory, and that Spanish control was maintained largely only in the southern provinces of Mindanao and Sulu, the Spanish relinquished control of the Philippines to the United States in 1899 as part of the Bates Treaty that ended the

Spanish-American War. The Philippines would not gain independence until 1946, until that time the United States created the Manila Government to rule over the Philippines.

During American rule in the Philippines, there was occasional conflict between the government and the Moro. This led to the creation of the Moro Province, encompassing the provinces of Sulu and Mindanao, a special administrative area created to preemptively quell any growing dissidence (Magdalena 1977, 300). The Manila Government claimed that it was actively trying to redistribute land back to the Moro people, whose land was stripped from them under the Spanish and were working as tenant farmers on the land. However, in reality little ancestral land was given back to the Moro and tenant farming remained the predominant practice until the 1960s, and not until the late 1980s did any significant land redistribution take place (Noble 1976a, 406). This created a system under which the Moro differed religiously, ethnically, geographically, and financially from the majority of Filipinos.

Beginnings of Separatist Movements

Separatist tensions in both Thailand and the Philippines began to emerge in the late 1940s and early 1950s, as a reaction to government policies. In Thailand, the military coup in 1938 created an unstable political atmosphere in which the pattern of attempted forced assimilation by the government on the Malay became an increasing issue. This included the eradication of the Malay language in schools, regulated curriculum in punohs (religious schools), and government pressure for Malays to take Thai

names (Harish 2006, 52). Haji Sulong became the leader of the first separatist movement in Thailand, the Islamic Council of the Pattani Province, sending a list of demands to the Thai government in April 1947 (Christie 1996, 183). Among the demands were a separate court that would recognize the Islamic faith for the basis of the law, for money derived from the southern provinces to be utilized in those provinces, and for the restoration of the Malay language in schools as well as for it to be the official language of the three southern provinces (Islam 1998, 444). Sulong and some of his supporters were arrested in 1948 for treason, resulting in a steady stream of violence for the remainder of the year ending with the declaration of a state of emergency in the southern provinces that would last for a decade. In 1959, as the emergency was ending, the BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani) was being formed by Tengku Abdul Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong's in the 1940s (Islam 1998, 446). The BNPP was the precursor to the current separatist groups the BRN and the PULO, its aims included an independent Islamic state (Islam 1998, 446).

In the Philippines, the Magsaysay administration continued the policy of stripping the Moro of their ancestral lands by hastening migration of northern Filipinos and Catholics into the southern regions (Noble 1976a, 406). The government claimed to undertake this movement to increase production in the southern provinces, which were producing below capacity, and thus solve the problems that were arising from an increasing population and low productivity levels (Noble 1976a, 406). However, this had a negative effect on the

Moros, as the Catholics and northern Filipinos soon became the majority in the south. A combination of Catholics and non-Moro northerners thus gained control of the local government positions and wealth in the region – and often over Moro land, as few of the Moros who lived and worked on their ancestral lands had legal documents to prove ownership (Noble 1976a, 407). This resulted in their land being taken by the Catholics and wealthier Filipinos who effectively controlled the legal system in the south. The first coordinated separatist group formed as a reaction to the Corregidor Incident in 1968. In March 1968, the Filipino government was planning an attack on Sabah, Malaysia. Sabah was a popular trading port that the government believed to be a smuggling area for Moros. In order to undertake the attack, the government constructed an all-Moro military unit. However, as the Moro were actively engaged in trade in Sabah and many Moro had relatives there, the Moro soldiers refused their orders. The Thai officials claimed that the soldiers staged an uprising in which thirty Moro soldiers were killed. However, the incident was interpreted differently by the Moro, who believed that the government murdered the soldiers and purposefully attempted to send an all-Moro unit to Sabah (Noble 1976a, 408). Following the incident, Udtog Matalam formed the first organized separatist movement, MIM (Muslim Independence Movement), which the government disbanded in 1970 (Noble 1976a, 408). However, MIM was an important precursor to a currently active separatist group, the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front).

The movements took different paths after this point in time. In Thailand, periodic uprisings were undertaken by various groups, but there was not consistent separatist violence from one group until a larger undertaking in the 1980s and later the most recent violence occurring since 2004. Conversely, in the Philippines in the 1960s several separatist groups emerged and became staples in the conflict until the present.

Modern Separatist Groups in Thailand

The two main separatist groups that currently operate in Thailand are the BRN (National Revolutionary Front) and the PULO (Patani United Liberation Organization). The BRN retained the religious underpinnings of the BNPP, as well as responding to economic issues developing in the southern provinces. The decline in the rubber market in the 1960s disproportionately affected the southern provinces and thus disproportionately impoverished Muslims as compared to the rest of Thailand (Islam 1998, 447). The BRN remains a largely secretive group, the leaders are unknown and the group rarely discussed its goals until recently, when it declared that it is attempting to create an independent state through revolution. The PULO, unlike the BRN, is secular in nature but still aims to create an independent Pattani state. The group was formed by college graduates who had received their degrees abroad, only to come back to Thailand and be unable to work as no one would hire them (Tan-Mullins 2006, 146). This has caused some graduates to leave Thailand, and a marked absence of educated Malay in leadership positions in the Thai government.

Modern Separatist Groups in the Philippines

Almost directly after the disbanding of MIM, the MNLF, the youth branch of MIM, came to the forefront. It directly outlined its political goals as well as the reasons for the formation of the group. Openness and clarity would remain a characteristic of the MNLF, as the leaders of the group are well known and have throughout the struggle been in periodic discussions with the government. While the Moro identify based on religion as well as culture, the MNLF focused on broader shared goals, including economic disparities in the southern provinces and government failures to respond to inequality. In doing so, the MNLF created a larger scope and support base for their cause than did Thai separatist groups. As a result, when the government declared martial law in October 1972, the MNLF had support not only in the Philippines but also in Malaysia which actively funded the group in the 1970s and 1980s (Noble 1976a, 411).

Differences in Separatist Movements

The separatist movements in Thailand and the Philippines share some similar qualities, including a minority Muslim ethnic group, movements originating at approximately the same time, and semi-defined goals for independent states/regions. However, the orientation of the modern dominant groups in each country has affected the nature of the conflict within the country. The BRN retains a pure Islamic message, which has limited its membership (i.e. the PULO). Additionally, the relative silence and secrecy of the group has hindered the possibility of communication with the government. This has created an atmosphere of suspicion in

the southern provinces of Thailand, where even Malays living in the southern provinces often remark that they are unsure of who is or is not a member of the BRN (Tan-Mullins 2006, 145). Conversely, membership in the MNLF has exceeded the tens of thousands at its peak, with the names and faces of top leaders well known throughout the country. The broader message of the MNLF has allowed for compromise, as seen in the recent peace talks with the government that resulted in the signing of a peace treaty. Despite the Filipino courts' failure to approve the treaty and subsequent relapse of violence in August 2008, the leaders of the MNLF were willing and able to meet with and compromise on issues of importance to the Moro, Muslims, and people of the southern provinces. It is evident that the nature of the separatist organizations has influenced the level of success or failure the movements will have diplomatically; however, it has been the governments' responses to the separatist movements that have influenced the severity of the groups and the violence that stems from them.

Government Action in Thailand and the Philippines

Action taken in part by the governments in Thailand and the Philippines has fueled separatist groups. In Thailand, the government's relentless pursuit of a national identity has caused the Malay to react by fighting relentlessly to maintain their cultural traditions. In the Philippines, the government's misappropriation of land left the Moro underrepresented politically and devastated financially. However, it is the capacity of the government to manage these issues that has most directly affected the ability of the

government to mitigate separatist violence.

Initial Government Responses to Separatist Movements

In the Philippines, major separatist organization began after the Corregidor Incident of 1968 and the subsequent consolidation of President Marcos power in 1972. One of Marcos's first actions as president was to declare martial law in the southern provinces. This included a massive reassignment of troops, with over 70 percent stationed in the southern provinces. Additionally, from 1972 through 1978 Marcos consolidated and strengthened his power as president. This included the firing of over 2000 government positions, a referendum that allowed him to appoint local officials, and Marcos holding both the positions of president and prime minister (Noble 1976b, 180). Despite the increased power of Marcos, he chose to negotiate with the MNLF leaders. A ceasefire was quickly established and maintained. Beginning in 1975, the MNLF leaders presented their goals to the Islamic Conference in Jeddah (OIC). The MNLF wanted a politically autonomous region, which would be comprised of thirteen southern provinces including all of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago (Noble 1976b, 181). President Marcos responded by offering autonomy but not full independence; instead, four regions would be constructed from the thirteen provinces. Each region would have a commissioner that would be directly under his (Marcos's) authority as well as the placement of Muslims in additional government positions focused on economic and social development (Noble 1976b, 181). The general terms were ac-

cepted by both the MNLF and Marcos. However, as the fine details of the peace agreement were being negotiated, the MNLF called for full autonomy and the implementation of Muslim leaders and law in the southern provinces. The government refused to accept these terms since in some of the thirteen proposed regions Muslims did not constitute the majority. The reason that Muslims did not constitute a majority in all of the southern provinces was a result of the Catholic "land reallocation" pursued by the government during Spanish colonization. Following a vote, only ten of the thirteen regions voted for autonomy and the Tripoli peace agreement subsequently fell apart. Hence, colonial policies continued to not only affect Filipino society but also hinder peaceful coexistence.

Despite the failure to complete a peace agreement between the MNLF and the Filipino government, an important precedent was set by the Marcos administration. Even though Marcos governed the Philippines in an authoritarian manner and amassed exorbitant control by undemocratic means, the government was willing to negotiate with the separatist groups in order to attempt to create peace in the Philippines. Working through the OIC created a positive dialogue between the government and the separatist leaders. Marcos was successful in establishing a five-year period of relative peace, especially following the 1976 ceasefire. This precedent allowed future negotiations and discussions between the government and main separatist groups in the Philippines, which has contributed to peace talks between the government and the MNLF for the last three decades. The value that Marcos

placed on negotiations became informally institutionalized in a sense, carrying through to future administrations and creating what would become a mechanism for separatist groups to air their grievances and communicate their goals; in essence, this created additional political avenues for separatists as opposed to using purely violent means to communicate with the government.

Thailand, instead of responding both diplomatically and militarily as the Philippines did, chose only military means to respond to separatism. This resulted in a markedly different outcome. With aid from the United States, Thailand began counterinsurgency efforts including the reassignment of troops to the southern provinces. In 1974, the ISOC (Internal Security Operational Command) was formed as a subdivision of the military to directly combat separatist action; which continues to operate in Thailand and the southern provinces. During this time, Thailand was politically unstable; student organization was squashed by the military followed by a military coup in 1976 (Morell and Samudavanija 1979, 319-20). This, along with increasing tensions between the military and the CPT (Communist Party of Thailand), created a government unable and unwilling to negotiate with separatist groups. In response, separatist violence increased throughout the 1970s, particularly among the PULO. Unlike in the Philippines, in which separatist leaders openly communicated with the government and their names and positions were well known throughout the country, in Thailand an environment of secrecy abounded. This was evident not only in the main separatist groups, the PULO and

the BRN, but also in other politically motivated groups such as the CPT. Both the separatist groups and the CPT retreated into the hills of southern Thailand. Just as the peace talks with Marcos placed value on open communication, so too did the actions of the Thai military in the 1970s; however, the Thai government created an environment in which identifying, let alone negotiating with, separatist groups became elusive.

Government Responses to Separatist Movements in the 1980s

After the failed peace negotiations in the Philippines of the early 1970s, violence once again began to increase throughout the early 1980s particularly as corruption increased in the Marcos administration and economic and social issues went unresolved. However, in 1986 Marcos was ousted during the four-day February Revolution, also referred to as the EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) Revolution (Villegas 1987, 194). The end of the revolution was accomplished through the resignation of Marcos and a new democratically elected government coming to power under President Corazon Aquino (Villegas 1987, 195). Aquino established a platform based on economic growth and an end to the insurgency; she began to recreate the stability necessary for these two goals to be accomplished. This included the reinstatement of civil liberties such as the writ of habeas corpus, freeing of political prisoners, and face-to-face meetings with the leaders of the MNLF (Villegas 1987, 196-97). Additionally, Aquino made efforts to renegotiate the peace agreement originally proposed under Marcos. The Republic Act 6734 put the original peace agreement back up for vote in a referendum

in 1989; however, only four of the provinces voted for the act (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 92). Despite only four of the thirteen provinces voting in favor of the referendum, the ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) was created in 1990. The ARMM operates as an autonomous government; the governments of the four provinces that voted in favor of inclusion are under the ARMM (Bertrand 2000, 40). It may appear as if the MNLF had reached its goal of an autonomous Mindanao and would subsequently no longer act as a separatist group. However, the group deemed the inclusion of only four of the thirteen provinces unacceptable and it continued to exist and communicate with the government.

The new policies of the Filipino government in the 1980s focused on tempering the insurgency through means other than martial law or direct military involvement. Instead Aquino focused on issues of stability throughout the country that were necessary for a functioning democracy, including greater institutional capacity after the centralized power under Marcos. Within a year of the revolution, the economy in the Philippines had improved and Aquino actively worked to improve the Philippines' image abroad as well as to reduce the Philippines' external debt (Villegas 1987, 201). This policy was overall effective in reducing the amount of widespread violence from separatist groups. While some violent outbreaks continued in the southern provinces, there was a clear reduction in the amount and severity of attacks.

During the 1980s, a secondary separatist group came to the forefront in the Phil-

ippines, when the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), an offshoot of the MNLF gained a following. This later complicated communication with the government, as the government was accustomed to negotiating with the MNLF and on several occasions failed to include the MILF in the discussions, which only aided in fueling violence from the MILF.

There was a significant decrease in violence in Thailand in the 1980s. This was due in part to the actions of General Prem Tinsulanonda as prime minister (1980 to 1988) to liberalize and create institutionalized changes in Thailand (Melvin 2007, 34). These changes were facilitated by an expanding economy and rapid industrialization in Thailand. Prior to the 1980s Thailand had relied on the export of agricultural products, resulting in Thailand having some of the lowest wages in the region and widespread poverty (Hussey 1993, 14). While the Southern Malay Provinces remained largely engaged in agriculture, the significant gains Thailand made beginning in 1985, led it to be dubbed "Asia's fifth tiger" (Hussey 1993, 14). With expanding economic power came an increase in educational funding and political awareness, which had begun to become evident in the 1970s during the October Revolution, with the increase in student political activity and the creation of the CPT (Paribatra 1993, 882). The media became freer to operate independently of the government, political parties grew and expanded, and there was the creation of a middle class in Thailand (Paribatra 1993, 883). These represent positive changes in Thailand, in which legitimate institutions existed through which Thai citizens could express their

political beliefs. The freedom of the press is crucial in creating accountability and transparency in a government. Additionally, increased political activity and political options (more political parties) allowed for a plurality not yet seen in Thai politics.

In addition to political and social changes, changes were implemented to address separatist concerns in the southern provinces as well. A military-civilian court was established to allow Malay citizens to report crimes that occurred during the military reign in the 1970s (Macan-Markar 2006). This was done in an attempt to reconcile the egregious crimes committed during military rule including the “disappearance” of many Malay activists, the military imprisonment of large groups of civilians, and the killing of suspected separatist sympathizers. The goal was to foster greater understanding between Thai Buddhists and Malays regarding the political situation in the south. The creation of a court to address the problems of the Malay signified the changing role of the government in Thailand. The government began to take political steps to institutionalize the role of the southern provinces within the Thai government.

Prime Minister Tinsulanonda created CPM 43, a new security taskforce. Unlike the security forces present in the south in the past, CPM 43 was subject to the constitution of Thailand and therefore could not hold civilians against Thai law (Melvin 2007, 13). Not only had the manner in which the government ensured security in the south changed, but also the administration of the southern provinces was changed in 1981. In conjunction with CPM 43, the Southern Bor-

der Provinces Administration Centre, (SBPAC) was formed (Melvin 2007, 13). This allowed greater control of the southern provinces by local officials and established amnesty for former separatists. This was part of the new government push for political participation and legitimate institutions rather than focusing directly on the eradication of separatist groups. This was a clear sign of the increasing capacity of the government. The Thai government had the capability not only to create institutions but also to ensure their success through nonmilitary means, a crucial aspect missing in state response prior to and after the 1980s. This had not been possible prior to this point in Thai history. However, the fragility of the emerging democracy was challenged in the early 1990s, when the plummeting economy in Thailand and a lack of full transparency by the government reversed the progress of the 1980s.

Government Action in the 1990s

In 1988, Prem Tinsulanonda stepped down as prime minister and [Chatichai Choonhavan](#) became the first prime minister to be an elected member of Parliament (Neher 1992, 595). It appeared as if the democratic transition in Thailand would occur effectively and peacefully. However these prospects were set back in 1991 when a military coup overthrew the elected Thai government. The coup was unexpected and surprised Thai government officials as well as the international community. There were several reasons why the coup occurred. With the increase in political parties and plurality in the 1980s came widespread factionalism in Thai politics. No one political party could hold a majority in parliament,

so coalitions were necessary. However, coalition alliances changed quickly and the past problems of corruption still haunted Thailand. With the freedom of the press instituted under Tinsulanonda, the corruption was reported on an almost daily basis. This, combined with the frustration of the Thai public with the incapability/unwillingness of the government to institute policies to decrease the gap between the wealthy elites and the poor majority, led to discontent in the country. Thus, when the military coup occurred in 1991, there were no immediate protests to the overthrow of the elected government (Neher 1992, 596).

The military coup was led by a group that called itself the National Peace Keeping Council, which appointed Anand Panyarachun as interim prime minister (Paribatra 1993, 887). Panyarachun worked on creating a Thai constitution (which became effective in 1997) and economic reforms. Elections were scheduled for March 1992. The elections resulted in the appointment of General Suchinda Kraprayoon (a member of the National Peace Keeping Council) as prime minister. Tensions quickly flared as Kraprayoon was not an elected member of Parliament. The Prime Minister attempted to relieve tensions by claiming that he would support an amendment to the constitution that Panyarachun had begun work on, that would make it necessary for the prime minister to be a member of Parliament. The coalition majority supported the proposed amendment but stipulated that Kraprayoon should remain prime minister for the duration of his term. This resulted in what came to be known as Black May in Thailand (Paribatra 1993,

888). Black May began on May 17, 1992 and continued until May 20. Hundreds of thousands of Thai citizens protested the premiership of Kraprayoon. The military initially responded by trying to violently suppress the protesters, resulting in approximately fifty deaths and hundreds of arrests. Under clear public scrutiny the coalition decided to enact the amendment that would stipulate that the prime minister had to be an elected member of Parliament, thus, ending Kraprayoon's term as Prime Minister (Shenon 1992). Anand Panyarachun, the interim prime minister from the military coup, reinstated himself as prime minister. The military leaders of the Kraprayoon administration were removed from their positions, and relative peace returned to Thailand for a time (Paribatra 1993, 890). However, the problems that reigned during Choonhavan's premiership continued, namely widespread poverty in the southern provinces, which continued to be ignored due to the political instability in the central government.

Thailand faced a severe economic downturn in the late 1990s, along with many other Asian countries. The growth that had begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s was created largely through foreign investments and loans. When the bubble on growth "burst" in the late 1990s, investors pulled out of Thailand and the government owed large amounts of money to outside investors (Pempel 1999, 149-150). In addition, the gap between the elite and the poor in Thailand was never adequately addressed during Thailand's economic growth; as such the poorest in Thailand were most effected by the downturn. During this time separatist violence in Thailand was almost

nonexistent, leading some to believe that the groups were no longer active. However, despite the signing of the new constitution in 1997, democratic initiatives in Thailand were overturned with the premiership of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001.

Similarly to Thailand, the early 1990s represented a time of relatively little separatist violence in the Philippines. After the February or People Power Revolution in 1986, the subsequent administrations were considered to be legitimate by both the general public in the Philippines as well as by the main separatist movements (the MNLF and the MILF) (Bertrand 2000, 38). Coinciding with the precedent set by Marcos, the Ramos government attempted to reconvene peace talks with the MNLF. Despite the creation of the ARMM, the MNLF wanted more provinces to be included in the administrative region. Unlike Marcos's administration, the new Filipino government was truly democratic and as such a lasting agreement seemed possible. Both the Filipino government and the MNLF had confidence that the other would uphold their end of the peace talks. The Ramos government had shown that democracy was becoming entrenched in the Philippines and the MNLF gained legitimacy through their backing by the OIC (Bertrand 2000, 39). These were the conditions under which the 1996 Peace Agreement was signed.

The agreement was largely based off of the initial Tripoli Agreement set out by Marcos. An administrative council, the SPCPD was placed in charge of the execution of the agreement. The implementation of the agreement took place over a three-

year period in which members of the MNLF were given positions in the military as well as the police, in addition to top spots in the SPCPD. Then, after the establishment of the SPCPD, a consolidation of the SPCPD and the ARMM created one administrative body for the fourteen then-independent provinces, after a vote by the fourteen provinces (Bertrand 2000, 42). In theory, the creation of these administrative bodies would create lasting institutions and a political framework through which separatist leaders could engage politically.

Problems began to emerge within the ARMM and the SPCPD shortly after their creation. Both have been plagued by mismanagement (in particular with regards to the budget), and the SPCPD had an uncertain role. The SPCPD was set up to be a transitory organization; it was not created to remain a part of the administration of the ARMM. As such the SPCPD holds little real power; its function instead is to convene to make suggestions to the Filipino government (Bertrand 2000, 47). The ARMM has been accused of acting as the "implementing arm of the government" (Bertrand 2000, 48) as opposed to an administrative body that represents the interests of the local communities.

There were several problems stemming from the peace agreement that made the possibility of a lasting peace settlement unlikely. First, the MNLF has been steadily losing power in the southern provinces. With the relative peace of the 1990s and a legitimate government, membership decreased. Additionally, the breakaway of the MILF (the military branch of the MNLF) left the MNLF with decreased military power as

well as influence (due to decreased numbers). This made the MNLF eager to sign a peace agreement. Second, only four provinces voted to join the ARMM in 1989 and the likelihood of the remaining provinces voting to join only a few years later was slim especially due to the decrease in separatist supporters. This limited participation made the creation of an actual autonomous region difficult. Also, the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the ARMM and the SPCPD made their success unlikely. These two factors together, a weakened MNLF and the limited number of provinces willing to join the ARMM, set the agreement up for failure. To complicate matters further, the MILF opposed the signing of the Peace Agreement. This was because the MILF claimed that the agreement failed to address the problem of the loss of Moro ancestral lands. Also, while they agree that it may have solved the problems of the MNLF, they believed that it did not address the true problems of the Moro people (which the MILF claimed to represent) (Bauzon 1999, 264).

The Current State of Separatist Movements

Amid the fallout of the problems of the 1996 Peace Agreement, the 1998 elections were a large loss for the MNLF and a new president was elected, former Vice President Joseph Estrada. Estrada's presidency set the backdrop for the rising tensions in the Philippines. Estrada stepped down as president in 2000, facing allegations of payoffs from illegal gambling. A resurgence in violence followed, with an increase in violence and kidnappings in 2000. After Estrada stepped down as president, Vice President Gloria

Arroyo became president of the Philippines (Montesano 2004, 94). Separatist violence continued to grow during Arroyo's first term, with other political issues prohibiting the government from addressing separatist groups. The government was plagued with problems, including attacks by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on military bases and continuing accusations of political corruption (Montesano 2004, 95-96). This corresponded with bombings by the MILF, the now more violent and powerful separatist group (Montesano 2004, 96).

Once again, peace talks were initiated to try to put an end to the violence in the southern provinces. In late 2003 Arroyo met with the MILF, and not the MNLF, along with the OIC to attempt to put into place a ceasefire and initiate peace talks (Montesano 2004, 97). The peace talks resulted in yet another peace agreement in the Philippines. In keeping with the pattern in the Philippines, in January 2005 the MILF fighters attacked government troops and the ceasefire was broken, resulting in another three years of violence (Montlake 2008). The most recent action in the Philippines maintains this pattern as well. In August 2008, the Filipino government and the MILF leaders reached an agreement to expand the size of the ARMM. This would have solidified a "homeland" for the Moro. However the Filipino Supreme Court issued a ruling to block the signing of the agreement, as it was seen as possibly unconstitutional and called for a hearing in which both the government and the separatist leaders would speak (Montlake 2008). This action by the Supreme Court was deemed unacceptable by the MILF leaders and violence has once

again marred the southern provinces. Hundred of thousands of people have been displaced and hundreds killed in the ensuing violence that continues as Filipino security forces attempt to hunt down the MILF leaders.

Despite relative peace in the 1980s and 1990s in Thailand, the turn of the twenty-first century saw a renewal of violence that had been dormant for thirty years. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Prime Minister Thaksin wanted to appear as if separatist violence had ended in Thailand as the United States announced a war on terror. Clearly, this was due to a fear of a U.S. invasion in Thailand as part of this war on terror. Thaksin attempted to eradicate indications of past separatism within Thailand (Storey 2008, 36). This included the dismantling of CPM 43 and the SBPAC, some of the only successful political institutions related to separatist violence Thailand had been able to create and maintain. Thaksin then installed local provincial leaders who would respond directly to him (Storey 2008, 37). These actions taken by Thaksin undermined the positive democratic changes that had taken place in Thailand and created instability with the removal of key institutions (i.e. CPM 43 and the SBPAC). Thaksin returned to the Thai tradition of centralized democracy, in an attempt to increase the power of his political party Thai Rak Thai, which had received little support from the south in the previous elections (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). Renewed violence emerged in the south in January 2004, including daily assassinations and kidnappings. Thaksin responded by declaring martial law in the southern provinces.

Thaksin quickly lost support as violence continued to wreak havoc on the country and in 2006 he was replaced in a military coup (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). An interim prime minister was appointed and the SBPAC and CPM 43 were reinstalled. The Thai government attempted peace talks with separatist leaders for the first time. However, the government still does not know who the leaders or members of the BRN (BRN-C) and the PULO are, so secondary leaders of disbanded groups were consulted. Due to this, the peace talks did not occur with current members of separatist groups, and as such the peace talks were not effective in resolving the current separatist violence. Violence continued and worsened in the southern provinces, peaking in 2007. There have been over 1,500 casualties since the fighting began again in 2004. Martial law continued in the southern provinces, with the military having full control of the region (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). This is a clear violation of the SPBAC, which is supposed to be in control of security in the south and has to follow Thai laws. Under martial law, the military does not have to comply with Thai laws and historically has not, instead committing heinous acts against the local Malay population. The most recent protests, in April 2009, exhibit the weakness of the Thai government. Thousands of protestors marched on the capital, Bangkok, disrupting the New Year festivities and inciting violence from the police. The protestors are not separatist members, but citizens frustrated by the corruption and political instability in Thailand. The attention now focused on the protests once again distracts the government from focusing on separatist violence. As

government attempts to control the protests, violence mars the southern provinces.

In Thailand, where institutions have been largely incapable of keeping up with the demand for response from the public, when attempts to institute policies that would aid the Malay were tried they have failed. This is evident historically, as no lasting political institutions were created in the sixty years since separatist violence began with the exception of CPM 43 and the SBPAC, and even they were dismantled for a period of time. A more recent example can be seen in the period following martial law in 2004, when the government held elections for Tambon councils (local administrative bodies) as well as PAOs (Provincial Administrative Organizations). In theory, this would have created power at the local level and representation for differing viewpoints (i.e. the Malay). Additionally, as 35 percent of budgets must be approved by the PAO, it would have allowed for Malay representation on financial matters (Albritton 2005, 170). However, by the end of the year the results had still not been confirmed by the government (Albritton 2005, 171). This pattern of government repression followed by attempts at reconciliation, each time too weak to reach demands, had repeated itself throughout the twentieth century and continued into the twenty-first century, each time eliciting an angered and violent response from the BRN.

Conversely in the Philippines, institutions were in place to address the grievances of the people. For example, beginning in the 1950s the Filipino government passed a series of Land Reform Acts that were

aimed at ending the cycle of tenant farming that was impoverishing the Moro. The original Land Reform Acts called for the tenant farmer to pay the taxes on the land in order to regain the land; however, the amount of the taxes owed per parcel of land was an unattainable amount for the Moro, and as such the acts as they stood aided fewer than 50,000 people within the first thirty years of its passing. However, due to the strong institutions present in the Philippines there were committees and councils through which the Moro could explain their concerns. Recent Land Reform Acts, in the last decade, have been more successful as share tenancy has been outlawed and institutions such as the Department of Agrarian Reform were established to monitor progress and work toward greater social justice.

Analysis

After chronicling the development of the separatist movements and the government responses to them, it is important to analyze how government action has affected separatist violence. There are two components upon which the case studies will be analyzed: state capacity and crisis vs. non-crisis transitions (a theory about democratic transitions). State capacity will be used to explain government action in Thailand and the Philippines from the 1940s to the 1970s, while crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used to explain government action in the 1980s and early 1990s (post-democratic transition), and both capacity and crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used to explain the current separatist situation in each country.

State capacity refers to the governments' ability to enact change, create institutions and infrastructure, and maintain

political stability within the country. The crisis vs. noncrisis transition theory, as proposed by Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, will be applied not to the democratic transitions within Thailand and the Philippines (though they both fit the model), but instead as a guideline through which to characterize government responses to separatist violence.

State Capacity

Before their democratic transitions, Thailand and the Philippines represented different levels of state capacity. Thailand had low state capacity, was politically unstable (frequent military coups) and lacked the ability to create meaningful and lasting institutions. However, the Philippines had high state capacity, with routine peace negotiations occurring between the President of the Philippines and the leaders of the MNLF beginning in 1975. Additionally, the Philippines began land reform acts in the 1960s and 1970s to restore the ancestral lands of the Moro.

Thailand suffered from issues surrounding low state capacity, which can be compared to theories that were presented in Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Huntington stated that as political consciousness increases, as a result of increased literacy, education, and industrialization, so too will political demands and participation. If a state, in this example Thailand, were to be unable to meet those expanding political demands, then the state's ability to create new institutions as well as the integrity of the current political institutions would be greatly undermined (Huntington 2006, 5). This can be seen in Thailand from the beginning of the govern-

ment's reaction to the separatist movement. As an attempt at conciliation, the Thai government passed the Patronage of Islam Act in 1945. The Act was aimed at addressing the complaints of the southern provinces, namely the Thai government's attempts at forced assimilation. The act created a position within the Thai government for an Islamic advisor, the *chularajamontri*, to the Thai king (Marshall 2008, 4). Additionally, shortly after the passing of the Patronage of Islam Act, the Thai government allowed Islamic law to be used in four of the southern provinces on issues related to heritage and family affairs. However, the Malay people did not respond as the Thai government expected. The Patronage Act incited anger among the Malay, as many thought the creation of an advisor on Islamic affairs to the king was yet another way for the government to monitor and undermine the Malay. Additionally, the *chularajamontri* did not come from the southern provinces; instead often the *chularajamontri* came from the Bangkok area (Marshall 2008, 4). As the *chularajamontri* was in control of the local leaders in the southern provinces and was their liaison to the central government, this only confirmed the Malay suspicion that the *chularajamontri* was not created in order to represent their interests, but instead another mechanism through which Thai control could be established over the Malay.

Low state capacity prohibited the government of Thailand from being able to make progress in reducing separatist violence. What action the government took seemed to only further the cause of the separatist groups. Due to its low capacity and ineffective government action, Thailand

largely relied on the military to control the terrorist actions of the separatist groups. This is evident by the decade-long emergency called in response to the formation of the first separatist groups in 1949. Additionally, the relative strength of the military in Thai society (seven military coups since the beginning of separatist violence) made the military the only lasting governmental force capable of dealing with separatist violence. When government action failed and Thailand faced political instability in the 1970s (a military coup in 1976 as well as violence stemming from the CPT), the government created the ISOC to manage separatist violence. Numerous problems emerged from the government's decision to allow the military to handle the separatist movements. The military did not have to follow Thai laws; this obviously resulted in widespread abuse in the southern provinces. Individuals were held without charges, people went missing, and executions would occur without trials. This type of military response did not temper separatist groups; it only helped to further their cause with the Malay people. Additionally, the military abuses undermined the legitimacy of the Thai government and failed to encourage political action over separatist violence.

In the Philippines, high state capacity worked to foster peace negotiations between the government and separatist leaders. As stated earlier, President Marcos first met with separatist leaders in order to engage in peace negotiations and a ceasefire in 1976. The ability for a government to effectively communicate and negotiate with a terrorist group is a large accomplishment. With the

OIC acting as a mediator, the government of the Philippines was able to communicate its goals and stance to the separatist leaders and vice versa. This form of open dialogue created a mechanism through which both parties could air their grievances. Additionally, it institutionalized a political mechanism through which separatist leaders' voices were heard by top government officials. This would establish the beginnings of political participation necessary for leaders from the MNLF to make the transition to local leaders in the ARMM.

Peace negotiations and ceasefires were helpful tools in creating temporary peace in the Philippines. However, there has yet to be lasting peace as the separatist groups, namely the MNLF and the MILF more recently, periodically renew violent outbursts. This is often done in response to an unfavorable result in a referendum or because the Filipino government fails to act fast enough to their demands. The causes of this reaction will be discussed in the analysis of "moral hazard" as well as the crisis vs. noncrisis theory.

Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory

Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory, as designed by Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, is used to explain democratic transitions. The theory states that economic and social conditions that are present in a country during its democratic transition will shape whether it responds in a crisis or noncrisis manner. There are several characteristics that are said to be emblematic of crisis and noncrisis transitions. In a crisis transition, the government will act quickly, the opposition powers gain greater influence in political decisions, and the military and

communist party are weakened.

According to the theory, a noncrisis response looks almost the opposite of a crisis response. The government reacts slowly to threats and power remains with authoritarian figures, the opposition has little role in government, and the military and communist parties are strong within the country (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 269). The theory presented is based on governments in transition responding to economic crisis. Haggard and Kaufman use Thailand and the Philippines as examples of noncrisis and crisis transitions, respectively, within their theory (270). However, these characteristics can also be used to explain the Thai and Filipino governments' responses to separatist violence after their democratic transitions.

The Philippines represents a crisis transition. This is evident in the government's action toward separatist groups. The first criterion of a crisis transition is quick government response to an issue. This is evident in the Philippines in the government's repeated negotiations with separatist leaders. Shortly after violence begins, the president of the Philippines reengages in negotiations with the MNLF leaders in order to successfully create a ceasefire and peace agreement. There have been over six peace agreements since Marcos's initial dealings with the MNLF leaders in 1976. The second criterion of a crisis response is increased influence given to the opposition power. This is arguably the Philippines largest problem in fighting separatist violence. The government's patterned response of going to the separatist leaders in order to create peace agreements has given disproportionate power to leaders

of the MNLF and the MILF. The government has already created the ARMM and created government positions for separatist leaders, and the separatist groups continue to demand more from the government. This has led to the breakdown of peace in the south as the separatist groups seek greater power and influence in the country. It appears as if the government's capacity to create peace agreements and ceasefires backfired due to the power that it has given the separatist leaders. The leaders of the MNLF and the MILF are aware that if they seek more from the Filipino government, all they have to do is create a violent backlash and the government will return with another peace agreement, including further provisions to meet their demands. As such there is no incentive for the separatist groups to uphold the peace agreements they enter into, as greater results can be garnered through violence. The last two criteria, a weak military and communist party, are characteristic of the Philippines. Additionally, the weakness of these two groups has enabled the government to focus on the issue of separatist violence, unlike in Thailand where political instability due to the power of the military and communist party has crippled the government's ability to act.

Thailand is an example of a noncrisis response. The government has been slow to respond to terrorists. This is for two reasons, the government's inability to act and subsequent reliance on the military, and the government's focus on other issues including violence from the communist party and political instability. Because of this, little political action was taken to temper separatist groups. The power in the Thai government

has remained with the central government due to its noncrisis response. The leaders of the BRN/BRN-C and the PULO are not known in Thailand and because of the government's lack of political action, there was no attempt to negotiate with them in the twentieth century. When recent attempts at peace negotiations were facilitated by the Thai government, the government was so unaware of who the separatist leaders were that officials met with a secondary separatist leader from a group that has long since been disbanded. Additionally, the current low capacity of the government has allowed for a resurgence in violence as actions taken in part by the government cannot be enforced (i.e. the re-installation of CPM 43 and the SBPAC). The separatist groups' secrecy was fueled by the government action taken against the communist party (as both groups retreated into the hills of the southern provinces) as well as by brutal military action. This has in part reduced membership in the group, as it is difficult for the groups to recruit new members due to their secretive nature and secluded locations. The last two criteria have been shown through government action, and the military's power is evident in its task of controlling the southern provinces. The CPT clearly exhibited a great deal of power, as the threat of the CPT was seen as greater than the threat of the BRN or the BRN-C by the Thai government. This is evident by the government focusing its attentions on the CPT as opposed to the separatist groups. While the Thai government's noncrisis response has effectively managed tensions (with the exception of periodic violence) and limited the size and scope of

separatist membership, it has not been able to mediate separatist violence when it does occur. The military has only been able to suppress the violence, not stop it. Once separatist violence begins, the Thai government does not have the mechanisms and institutions in place to arbitrate the conflict.

Issues for Future Peace in Thailand and the Philippines

Both Thailand and the Philippines will need to alter their policies toward separatist movements, for either country to be successful in ending separatist violence. In Thailand, the historically weak central government has resulted in the use of military responses to separatist violence and at times full military control of the south. In the Philippines, the strength of the central government coupled with international support from the OIC has led to multiple peace negotiations and ceasefires. However, the government's failure to impose strict consequences for violations of the peace agreements has created a pattern of violence, through which the separatist groups have gained greater power over the central government.

Issues in Thailand: Stability and Diplomacy

As noted previously, the central government of Thailand continues to struggle to establish political stability. Currently, protests rage in the capital in response to the recent elections. Until the government can create lasting stability, including open and free elections, the government will remain unable to respond diplomatically to separatist threats. The Thai government's historical reliance on the military to control separatist violence has led to widespread military

abuses and has left separatist members with no political avenues through which to express their grievances.

Even if the current government of Thailand were to sign a peace agreement with separatist leaders (providing the government could effectively find the leaders of the main separatist groups, the BRN and the PULO), the agreements may be of little consequence as the government's legitimacy is in question. Also, the ability of the government to follow through on any agreement would be unlikely. For Thailand to establish political stability, greater transparency and institutions that are viewed as legitimate by the public will need to be put into place. The beginning of this was seen in the 1980s and 1990s in Thailand, when there was increased political participation and political awareness. It is not uncommon for a country undergoing a democratic transition to experience increased violence and instability, as has been the case in Thailand. If Thailand could reestablish the level of progress it possessed in the 1980s and 1990s, then steps toward reducing separatist violence could be taken. This occurred briefly with the creation of the SBPAC and CPM 43 in 1981. Without diplomatic action, the abuses that occur under full military control will only help to further the separatist cause. Additionally, as is occurring presently in Thailand, when there is dissatisfaction in the country (protestors as well as separatist violence), the government will not have the mechanisms in place with which to diffuse the conflict.

Issues in the Philippines: Moral Hazard

The concept of moral hazard applies

to the peace negotiations between the Philippines and the MNLF, and more recently the MILF. As earlier stated, the separatist groups have violated several peace agreements and ceasefires in the last three decades. The reason for this can be explained through moral hazard. Moral hazard can be applied to any agreement between two parties; it functions on the principle that parties will behave according to costs and benefits. When entering into an agreement, if the benefits of not following the contract outweigh the costs of breaking the agreement, then the party may intentionally act in a way that violates moral norms or the contract itself (Mirrlees 1999).

In the case of the Filipino separatist groups, the first peace agreement, the Tripoli Agreement signed in December of 1976, there were no provisions put in place that would give the MNLF incentives to abide by the agreement. There is no mention of repercussions for not following the peace agreement or for breaking the ceasefire. The agreement outlines the concessions to be made by the Central Government to the MNLF, including the creation of an autonomous region in the southern provinces, separate Sharia courts, guaranteed representation for Muslims in the central government as well as in all Filipino courts, and amnesty for political prisoners and separatist group members for crimes committed in the southern provinces (Government of the Republic of the Philippines 1976). Concessions to be made by the MNLF included only certain areas not to be included in the autonomous region and a percentage of profits from mining. This agreement conceded to the MNLF one of its largest goals, the creation of a

separate autonomous region in the south to be governed by Muslims according to Islamic law. However, as stated, not all of the southern provinces were to be included in the autonomous region. The MNLF used this as a reason to break the agreement and, without penalties for breaking the agreement, incited further violence in the southern provinces. This led the Central Government to engage in further peace negotiations (and concessions) with the MNLF and gave the MNLF the power and influence it wanted in the Philippines.

This is obviously problematic for the Philippines, despite the government's ability to successfully negotiate with separatist leaders; the negotiations are not effective if the separatists have no intention or incentive to follow the stipulations of the ceasefire. In order to create lasting ceasefires that could result in an end to separatist violence, the government needs to enact stringent penalties for breaking a ceasefire or peace agreement. Furthermore, these repercussions need to be written into the peace agreements so that they are not merely threats, but legal ramifications for failure to uphold a contract. Additionally, if the MNLF or the MILF does break the peace agreement/ceasefire, the consequences laid out by the government must be enforced in the fullest capacity. Without these consequences, the violence in the Philippines will continue to escalate as the separatists seek greater power and influence in the country.

The only attempt to take such action by the Filipino government was with the signing of the "Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Trip-

oli Agreement of Peace of 2001" (Government of the Republic of the Philippines 2001). The guidelines established actions taken by the MNLF or the MILF that would constitute criminal actions and violations of the agreements established with the Filipino government. This was a step forward by the Filipino government in asserting its authority over the separatist groups and establishing actions that would not be tolerated by the government. Additionally, the presence of U.S. military troops in the southern Philippines temporarily maintained peace in the region. However, the government failed to follow through on the guidelines set forth, as within two years the government was once again engaging in peace negotiations with the separatist groups, despite the failure of the separatist groups to uphold the guidelines. Additionally, the government has recently attempted to sign a peace agreement that would expand the size of the ARMM. This only reaffirms the process the separatist groups create, creating greater violence to gain greater rewards from the government.

There are several different ways to deal with the problem of moral hazard in the Filipino case. The government could simply place an ultimatum on the separatist groups, that if they do not comply with future peace agreements than the government will no longer negotiate with them. However, considering the track record of the Filipino government separatist groups may not take the ultimatum seriously. Additionally, if the government were to diplomatically cut off the separatist leaders, then it would only serve to force the separatist groups outside of the political system and most likely

increase the violence in the southern provinces. It is a benefit to the government that the separatist leaders have been able to marginally integrate into the political spectrum; it would be a mistake to alienate the leaders of these movements.

The government could continue with the status quo, in which it is able to procure relative peace for a short period of time. However, the pattern that has been created by the government has already given disproportionate power to the separatist leaders and the current position of the government does not provide for long-term solutions to the problem of separatist violence. The third option available to the government is to take a multifaceted approach to the separatists. This would include both internal diplomacy, international support, and a military response to noncooperation. The government should continue to meet with separatist leaders; it is its direct link to the motivations and demands of the separatist groups. However, this does not mean that the government has to necessarily continue to sign peace agreements and give concessions to the separatist leaders. Due to the creation of the ARMM, separatist leaders hold political positions through which they can participate in government. The Filipino government should encourage participation through governmental as opposed to extra-political means. International support is necessary due to the international support that the MNLF and the MILF hold. Presently, international support has been behind the MNLF and the MILF; this has put the Filipino government in a defensive position that has only worsened the interests of the Philippines in peace negotia-

tions. With the proper international backing, the Filipino government can present a stronger front at negotiations and have international backing if military force is necessary against the separatist groups. This can also act as a preventative measure, so that the separatist groups understand that the Filipino government is serious about the consequences for breaking a peace agreement or ceasefire. The last component, military force, may be necessary if the separatist groups continue to be combative. As earlier stated, it would be a mistake to cut off the separatist groups diplomatically because of its important link to the groups' goals and motivations. By setting out specific military consequences to not abiding by peace agreements and ceasefires, separatists will have a clear understanding of the repercussions of violating the agreements. This is more effective than the current military action, because the government has not set guidelines for the military initiatives. Instead the military is sent to "hunt" down leaders responsible for certain events, which turns into several raids and deaths, but soon the government is once again negotiating with separatist leaders. There needs to be a clear plan and goal of a military initiative, not simply letting troops loose in the southern provinces, which does not gain separatist compliance. This last option seems the most viable for long-term peace. It addresses not only the immediate problems of violent outbreaks with military intervention, but also the long-term problems of separatist noncompliance. This is not to say that this plan will create immediate peace. It is likely that any new initiative the government takes against separatist violence will, in the short run at least, increase

separatist violence. This is because the separatists are quite content with the status quo, as it benefits them and their goals. However, if the government can mitigate the short-term violent response and continue with a plan toward long-term peace, then the Philippines will be able to temper and hopefully eliminate separatist violence.

Conclusions and Prescriptions

The case studies of Thailand and the Philippines exemplify differing government responses to terrorism. Both Thailand and the Philippines experience separatist violence stemming from minority Muslim ethnic groups in the southern regions of the countries. However, the governments' responses to these separatist threats have shaped the current security situations in the countries. In Thailand, the country's low capacity forced a reliance on the military to control separatist violence. Without restraints on the military, few legal implementations were used in detaining or executing prisoners. This abuse contributed to ongoing separatist violence. In the Philippines, the government's high capacity allowed for negotiations with top separatist leaders. However, without restraints placed on the separatist groups to ensure their upholding of the peace agreement, the MNLF and the MILF continue to wreak havoc on the southern provinces in order to gain greater control of the region.

In this sense, Thailand used only military means through which to subdue separatist violence due to the inability of the government to use diplomatic means; whereas in the Philippines, the focus of government action has been through diplomatic

means (though increased military initiatives have been taken recently), but the lack of follow-through by the government to impose strict and meaningful repercussions for violating peace agreements has resulted in a cycle of violence.

In order for lasting peace to be achieved by Thailand and the Philippines changes, will need to be enacted. In Thailand, the first step toward reduced violence is strengthening and legitimizing the central government. Separatist groups in Thailand were largely dormant in the 1980s and 1990s, when the government was at its peak effectiveness. It seems that the separatist are willing to accept positive change in the country, whether it is political, economic, or social. When the government focused on domestic issues and not military intervention in the south, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, separatist violence was at its lowest point, since its beginnings in the 1940s.

In the Philippines, the government needs to create one clear message on how it will handle separatist violence. As it stands, the government has historically allowed separatists to break peace agreements, resort to violence, and then gain concessions from the government. Only recently has the government expressed what actions would violate peace agreements. Even after the "guidelines" were presented, the Filipino government met again with separatist leaders two more times, to offer an expansion of provinces in the ARMM. These mixed messages offer no incentive for separatist to cooperate with the government. Even when the government threatens military repercussions, the separatist have been willing to deal with the military for a short period, knowing

the government will soon offer new incentives and peace agreements, as in the 2003 and 2008 peace agreements. The Filipino government needs to not only set repercussions for not following peace agreements, but to follow through with these consequences. Otherwise, the current cycle of violence and then negotiations, with the separatist leaders welding the power, will continue to plague the country.

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